Sentencing Act 2002 – s 102 presumption of life imprisonment for murder – life imprisonment not imposed as sentence would be manifestly unjust – s 104, 17 year minimum period of imprisonment in some circumstances – manifestly unjust to impose minimum period of imprisonment – 18-year sentence of imprisonment imposed – Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act – disposition required under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act).
R v Dickason [2024] NZHC 1704 per Mander J
Lauren Dickason appeared for sentencing on 26 June 2024 after a jury found her guilty of murdering her three daughters, Liané, Maya and Karla.
Dickason, 43, who travelled to New Zealand with her family from South Africa just weeks before the murders, had struggled with depression since she was 15. She became a general practitioner and married in 2006, but faced difficulties with conception, leading to prolonged fertility treatments.
After suffering a miscarriage and giving birth to her first child in 2014, Dickason sought psychiatric help for postpartum depression. She continued to struggle with mental health issues, including ongoing depressive symptoms, following the birth of her twins in 2018. Despite periods of improvement, her mental health declined again in 2021 during the stressful process of emigrating to New Zealand amidst the covid-19 pandemic.
Upon arrival in Timaru, she struggled with adjusting to her new environment, managing the children and establishing a new household. Her mental state continued to deteriorate, marked by sleep impairment, weight loss, feelings of hopelessness and anxiety. This decline culminated in her experiencing intrusive thoughts and ideations of harming her children.
On the evening of 16 September 2021, Dickason’s husband left her at home with her three children while he attended a work event. Dickason then gathered her children together in a bedroom, retrieved a packet of cable ties and told the girls she was going to make necklaces. Dickason then placed the cable ties around her children’s necks and attempted to strangle them. This failed so she suffocated each of her children by smothering them with a towel or blankets. Dickason then attempted to take her own life by an overdose of medication.
Under s 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002, a sentence of life imprisonment must apply unless, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, such a setnece would be manifestly unjust.
Dickason’s offending fell within s 104(1)(h), (e) and (g) of the Act as there were three victims who, as young children, were particularly vulnerable and the murders were committed with a high level of brutality.
Accordingly, s 104 of the Act was engaged, which requires a minimum sentence of imprisonment of 17 years, unless such a sentence would be manifestly unjust.
Mander J first considered what the notional minimum term of imprisonment might be. The Crown proposed a starting point in the range of 24 to 26 years. Counsel for Dickason proposed a range of 22 to 24 years.
Mander J held that should a life sentence be imposed, the starting point before any notional minimum period of imprisonment would be 24 years. This assessment did not take into account Dicakson’s mental health issues.
Mander J then went on to consider the effect of Dickason’s mental health on the sentencing.
Because her defence of insanity was rejected at trial, Mander J was required to proceed on the basis that Dickason’s major depressive disorder did not affect her to the extent that she did not know her actions in killing her children were morally wrong. However, he did accept that the actions were a product of her mental disorder. As a result, Mander J accepted defence counsel ‘s submissions that but for her mental disorder, the tragic event would not have occurred.
Accordingly, Mander J concluded that while Dickason’s crimes were severe, her significant mental breakdown, caused by a major depressive disorder, made it manifestly unjust to impose a 17-year minimum period of imprisonment.
The judge applied the same reasoning in his decision not to impose a sentence of life imprisonment, also citing Dickason’s lack of a propensity for violence and genuine remorse.
Mander J then imposed a finite sentence of 18 years imprisonment, with no minimum period of imprisonment.
After hearing evidence from three psychiatrists, Mander J said Dickason’s mental disorder necessitated compulsory treatment for her own safety. He issued an order for her detention and treatment in a hospital under the Mental health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act).
Applicable principles: Criminal responsibility and sentencing – mental health and compulsory treatment – mental health and moral culpability.
Held: Manifestly unjust in the circumstances to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or a minimum period of imprisonment. A finite sentence of 18 years imprisonment was imposed.
Jamie Dierick is a law clerk working for an Auckland criminal defence barrister
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